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INTRODUCTION
Teenagers have complicated decisions to make while they learn
about themselves and their changing bodies. The more information
and support that adolescents have, the better equipped they are to
experiment with intimate relationships. With or without proper
parental support and guidance, teenagers make choices about their
sexuality, choices that often have serious consequences. This paper
argues for expanded sex and health education classes in the public
school system, as a means of supplementing teenagers' knowledge
about pregnancy, AIDS, venereal diseases and birth control. Sex
education classes often neglect to cover these controversial topics,
preventing students who need the input the most from learning
crucial information. Despite its immediacy, the issue of expanded sex
and health education in public school systems remains unresolved in
our courts.
In 1991, the New York Board of Education ("Board") decided to
meet the growing demand for increased teen awareness and reproduc-
tive resources by expanding their current health education curricula.
The Board added a voluntary condom distribution program in which
students could receive condoms and counseling if they chose to utilize
the service. A group of parents sued the Chancellor and the Board,
claiming that the program violated their due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and their right to free exercise of religion
under the First Amendment. The parents did not seek to abolish the
program, but rather, to add a parental consent provision enabling
them to preclude their child from obtaining condoms.
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The Supreme Court of New York ("lower court") ruled in favor of
the Board,1 allowing the program to continue as it was originally
implemented, without a parental consent provision. The lower court,
in analyzing the constitutional implications, focused on the fact that
the program was voluntary. The NewYork Supreme Court, Appellate
Division ("appellate court"), reversed the lower court and declared
the program an unconstitutional violation of petitioner's parental
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate court
instructed the public school to add a parental consent provision as a
means of curing the constitutional defect. Both the appellate and the
lower courts agreed on the free exercise of religion interpretation.
Each court ruled that no viable claim could be premised on the
parents' proffered assertion of a First Amendment infringement.
This article argues that the program is constitutional and that the
appellate court's analysis is flawed. The appellate court found the
voluntary condom distribution program to be: (1) a health service,
as opposed to an educational program, which requires parental
consent under New York's Public Health Law; (2) a violation of the
parents' liberty interest in raising their children in accordance with
their own beliefs; and (3) lacking the requisite compelling state
interest necessary to override the parents' constitutionally protected
liberty interest.
This paper hypothesizes that the parents did not have a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in rearing their children when the
program at issue was of a voluntary nature. Second, the program
should have been classified as an educational service, thus removing
it from the purview of mandatory parental consent under the law.
The court neglected to sufficiently address the privacy right of minors
to receive contraception without their parents' permission. Third,
even if the court upheld the program based on a parental liberty
interest, the state's interest in combating AIDS and teen pregnancy is
strong enough to meet the compelling necessity prong, thereby
superseding the parents' interest in abolishing the program. Lastly,
this author suggests that the appellate court's disparate conclusions
regarding the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims of the parents
illustrate how notions of morality, rather than justice, shaped the
majority opinion.
1. In re Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406, 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding, in part, that the
petition seeking an order to enjoin the implementation of the condom distribution program,
unless the minors' parents consented, was denied).
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I. PARENTrS' DUE PROCESS CLAIM
In Alfonso v. Fernandez,2 the appellate court held that the condom
distribution program implemented in the New York public school
system violated petitioners' due process rights.' The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as granting parents a liberty interest in the
care, custody and moral education of their children.4 The Court first
recognized a constitutional right to raise one's children without
interference from the State in Meyer v. Nebraska5 In Meyer, the
Supreme Court decided that a statute which prohibited teaching
foreign languages to children in public school up until the eighth
grade was an unconstitutional infringement upon parents' liberty
interest as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.6  The
Supreme Court found the statute was an illegitimate exercise of state
power.7 The Court defined the extent to which parental rights exist
under the Fourteenth Amendment:
[liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children .... 8
Liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are implied
fundamental rights which may not be arbitrarily interfered with by
state legislatures.9 The Supreme Court enunciated a doctrine
2. 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
3. Id at 268.
4. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that private school
owners may assert the rights of prospective students and their parents, where the Fourteenth
Amendment gives parents a liberty interest in directing their child's education); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (asserting that the First and Fourteenth Amendments preclude
states from barring children from learning a foreign language of which their parents approve).
Cf Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (noting that removing children from the custody
of their parents, when the State shows a legitimate interest in protecting the childrens' welf-are,
does not violate parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment affords parents
a liberty interest in caring for their children free from state interference).
6. I& at 400 (defining the liberty right of parents to include matters such as religion,
morality and the education of children).
7. Id. (holding that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the parents' liberty rights
under the law of due process).
8. Id. at 399.
9. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (stating that fundamental or
liberty rights, such as those dealing with sex, marriage or child-bearing, fall within the broad
category of the "right to privacy"). This right to privacy is constitutionally protected even
though it is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Id. at 485. A general rule from Griswold
is that where a "right to privacy" exists, any governmental interference with such a right subjects
the interference to strict scrutiny, thereby requiring a compelling justification by the state in
order for its interference to be constitutional. Id. at 479.
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requiring statutes to bear a reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the state to effect." Statutes must
effectuate a demonstrated, compelling state interest if they interfere
with individuals' liberty interest rights." Since Meyer, parents have
enjoyed a well-recognized liberty interest in rearing and educating
their children in accordance with their own views.12  A state can
intrude on this historic right only by showing an overriding necessi-
ty 
13
Twenty years later, in Prince v. Massachusetts,'4 the Court reaffirmed
the liberty interest established in Meyer, but carved out exceptions to
the protected private realm of family life, the parents' domain. In
Prince, a woman gave a minor in her custody magazines to sell in
violation of a Massachusetts child labor statute.15 The facts juxta-
posed a guardian's right to control her child against the state's
interest in overseeing the welfare of that particular child. Accommo-
dating the earlier principle, while recognizing the need for state
intervention in some instances, the Court altered its conventional
supposition. 8 Prince redefined the situations in which parents' rights
may be regulated in the public interest, and stated:
10. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (declaring that arbitrary legislative action is subject to
judicial review).
11. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265 (noting that a showing of overriding necessity must be
demonstrated by a state before legislation which interferes with a fundamental right can be
constitutionally upheld).
12. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (asserting that the state may not limit the range
of knowledge available to minors). The Giswold Court reaffirmed the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to study a foreign language as addressed in Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401, and
expanded this logic to grant minors First Amendment protection to receive a "spectrum of
available knowledge." Griswod 381 U.S. at 482.
13. SeeAlfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (recognizing thatAIDS presents a public health concern
of such magnitude that the state has a compelling interest in distributing condoms to sexually
active teens in order to prevent the spread of this disease). Contra Donald Schoemaker, Sex
Education: The Dissemination of Family Planning Services and Contraceptives in Public Schools, 8 J.
LEGML MED. 587, 596 (1987) (claiming that the Supreme Court's treatment of parents'
fundamental liberty interest is really a way to control children's ideas about sex).
14. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
15. Id. at 161 (citing chapter 149, section 80 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, which states that anyone who provides a minor with prohibited material and
knows that minor will, or encourages that minor to, sell the material in violation of child labor
proscriptions "shall be punished by a fine ... or by imprisonment.., or both." Section 81
prescribes substantially lower fines and imprisonment penalties to the parents of such minors.).
16. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-70 (asserting that the state has authority over childrens'
activities because the family is not beyond regulation if doing so would be in the public
interest). Seegenerally Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (declaring that bigamy and polygamy
destroy the sanctity of marriage and family and thus are subject to the state's punishment). Cf
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (noting that the constitutional protection
accorded to words and acts is based on "proximity and degree" to inciting a prohibited
behavior).
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[a] cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and
in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because
the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of
conduct on religion or conscience.
17
Meyer and Prince together establish the fundamental right to raise a
family, but clearly leave room for a state to intervene on behalf of the
child's best interest if the state believes the parents are treating a
minor in an unlawful manner.
Following Meyer and its progeny, the Alfonso court decided that the
condom distribution program impermissibly trespassed on petitioners'
parental rights without a compelling reason for the state to do so.'"
The Alfonso court held that the condom distribution component of
New York's sex education curricula was unconstitutional, because it
forced parents to obviate their fundamental right to directly control
the sexual activities of their children.
19
Arguably, the Alfonso rationale is flawed because the program is
voluntary, and as such, does not interfere with parents' right to care
for their minor child in accordance with individual family values.
20
Forcing students to be the recipients of condoms would place the
parents' rights in jeopardy. Merely making condoms available on
request does not infringe upon parents' ability to care for their
children as guaranteed by the Constitution.
"2 1
17. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
18. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265 (holding that the Constitution permits parents to have sole
control over their child's sexual behavior, and absent a compelling state interest, the condom
distribution program conflicts with this well-recognized liberty interest).
19. See id. (commenting that the voluntary nature of the program did not cure the
constitutional infirmity).
20. SeeKarlJ. Sanders, Kids and Condoms: Constitutidonal Challenges to theDistribution ofCondoms
in Public Schools, 61 U. GIN. L REv. 1479 (1993). Sanders argues that:
[b]oth Alfonso and Doe were correct to conclude that a state does not infringe
upon parental rights where it merely provides minors with an opportunity to
exercise their own free will. Objections to voluntary programs inherently derive
from a failure to legislate parental concerns. Thus, the issue is not constitutionally
suspect state action, but rather the legislative prerogative of state inaction.
I at 1509-10. Sanders' article was written in support of the lower court's opinion regarding
condom distribution in the New York public school system, before Alfonso was appealed. The
lower court rejected all of the parents' claims. Sanders' comment explores the feasibility of
future challenges to voluntary condom distribution programs and concludes that such claims
are difficult to pursue because the issues are purely legislative and political, rather than
constitutional.
21. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (Eiber, J., dissenting) (noting that the difference
between a voluntary and compulsory program is the determining factor in whether a viable
claim can be made by the parents).
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A. Alternative Analysis of Condom Distribution Programs from Doe v.
Irwin
A close examination of another condom distribution program
delineates how the New York court could have found the program to
be constitutionally valid if it had chosen to follow a line of cases
suspiciously neglected or erroneously interpreted by the Alfonso
majority.2
In Doe v. Irwin,2" parents brought a class action suit against a
family planning center, alleging that the practice of distributing
contraceptives to unemancipated minors, absent parental consent,
violated their constitutional rights.24 The district court held that
distributing contraceptives to minors without parental notification was
an infringement upon the constitutional rights of the parents. 5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned the
district court and held that the practices of the center were not
violative of any constitutional rights of the parents.26 This paper
argues that the Sixth Circuit court's analysis in Doe should have been
followed by the Alfonso court.
The facts in Doe, in brief, are as follows: a family planning center
located in Lansing, Michigan, operated by the Ingham County Health
Department and under contract with the Michigan Department of
Public Health, provided services to both adults and minors.2 The
program permitted minors to come to the center without parental
28consent or notification. The center also prescribed and distributed
22. See Eve W. Paul & Dara Klassel, Minors' Right to Confudential Contraceptive Servies: The
Limits of State Power, 10 WOMEN'S RTs L. REP. 45 (1987) (arguing that condom use is a crucial
component of teen pregnancy prevention). The article quotes from a study comparing
adolescent pregnancy rates of the United States with five other developed countries, which have
free and confidential services to teens, and reports that:
[u]nfortunately, the encouragement of'diligent contraceptive use' and the removal of such
barriers to services as lack of confidentiality and cost has been a public policy goal which
has suffered from the shifting political tides of the late twentieth century.
Id. at 45-46. See also Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Henshaw, Lincoln, Rostoff, Westoff & Wulf,
Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: Determinants and Policy Implications, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
53 (1985) (noting that the rate of teen pregnancy in the United States is higher than in any
other developed nation, even though teen sexual behavior patterns in these nations are
parallel); The Next Contraceptive Revolution, 18 FAm. PLAN. PEPsp. 19 (1986) (claiming that 80%
of teenage pregnancies in the United States are unintended).
23. 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 1167 (noting parents' Fourteenth Amendment rights "to the care, custody and
nurture of their children").
25. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
26. Doe 615 F.2d at 1168.
27. Id. at 1163.
28. Id.
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contraceptives to minors without parental consent.2 9 The center did
not perform abortions or sterilizations and would not insert an IUD
without parental consent.3" All minors who wanted contraception
had to attend a weekly "rap session" explaining birth control methods
and the responsibilities connected to being sexually active. During
the educational sessions, counselors encouraged minors to discuss
their sexual activities and interests with their parents. 2 Counselors
offered advice on how to communicate about this sensitive topic with
parents.33 The administrator told the court that employees "do not
advocate that unmarried teenagers become sexually active. However,
they try to deal with individuals 'where they are' and promote their
physical and psychological well-being."'
Factually, the program at the center did not differ significantly from
the voluntary condom distribution program implemented in New
York. The high school program had two components.35 The first
consisted of classroom instruction on various aspects of HIV/AIDS
and birth control.36 Instructors stressed abstinence.3 This phase
was mandatory, but included an opt-out provision where parents
could request that their child be left out of the classroom instruction
because they provided this information at home.3
The second component of the health education program allowed
high schools to make condoms available to students upon request.39
Trained professionals gave the students counseling on the proper use
of condoms and discussed problems related to their misuse.4" This
second component of the health education program was voluntary.
Students were not required to participate, nor were they penalized for
not participating." The condom distribution program, however, did
not have an opt-out or notification provision for parents, because the
29. I&
30. Id
31. Doe, 615 F.2d at 1163 (detailing the topics covered and the purpose of the educational
groups).
32. Id. at 1164 (describing how counselors invited inquiring parents to attend "rap sessions"
and offered to help minors discuss sexuality with their parents).
33. d.
34. Id.
35. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (describing how the expansion of the health education
program was designed to provide more knowledge and precautionary measures).
36. Id. (noting that the required curricula included lessons on means of HIV transmission




40. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
41. Id.
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Board felt it would compromise the anonymous nature of the
program.
4 2
B. The Doe Court Rejects Alfonso Parents' Due Process Claim
The condom distribution programs in Doe and Alfonso were identical
except for the setting, yet two courts came to drastically different
conclusions on the same issues. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Doe, rejected the lower court's holding that distributing contracep-
tive devices to minors without parental consent was unconstitution-
al.43 The Doe court of appeals distinguished the exact same cases
cited by the Alfonso petitioners in their argument for parental rights
to prevail. The Sixth Circuit noted that in those cases, the "state was
either requiring or prohibiting some activity.""
The Supreme Court cases cited by the complaining parents in both
Doe and Alfonso were inapplicable, because parents had no ight to be
notified of their childrens' voluntary decisions.' The court found
no constitutional intrusion nor deprivation of liberty meriting any
protection under the United States Constitution in Doe.46 The
constitutional debate over whether or not the high school program
intruded on the relationship between parent and child should
similarly have been narrowed solely to the question of compulsion, or
lack thereof.47 Without state compulsion for action or inaction, no
exertion of police power can be said to have unconstitutionally
undermined a guaranteed liberty interest. The distinguishing factor
42. Id. at 268-69 (Eiber, J., dissenting) (discussing the former Chancellor's decision to
supplement HIV/AIDS education with condom availability on a voluntary basis). The Board
specifically elected not to allow disapproving parents the option to deny their child access to the
program, feeling that these children needed the service the most and an opt-out provision might
"limit participation in the program as to make it ineffective." Id.
43. Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168.
44. I& (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)).
45. See also Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parental Rights and Public Education, 59 Educ. L. Rep. (West)
271 (1990) (arguing that the reformulation of parental rights in relation to education in the last
half-century grants states and students more rights than previously experienced because the
judiciary no longer has complete faith in parents' choices). Mawdsley states that "there is also
a clear awareness existing that public schools have an inculcative function that at some point
may conflict with the parents' views, perhaps not so much regarding an individual child as
children generally in the community." Id. at 273.
46. Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168 (asserting that parents' rights have not been unconstitutionally
violated in the absence of a notification provision. The state, not the federal courts, should
decide whether parents are involved in every stage of minors' decision-making process.).
47. Id. at 1169 (finding no constitutional requirement for family planning clinics to notify
parents when their children use their services. The court asserts that mandating parental
involvement is antithetical to the purpose of federally funded ciinics as a confidential
reproductive resource.).
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of compulsion was not present in Alfonso, nor in Doe, as the court
properly ascertained.
In Doe, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the lower
court erred in its analysis of the three rights asserted: the parents'
right to the care and nurturance of their children; the minors' right
to personal privacy; and, the state's interest in public health and
welfare.1 The lower court wrongly held that the parental right was
strong enough to "require the state to impose a limitation on the
rights of minors which the state had not chosen to impose."49
Without a compulsory quality, there was no actual right of the parents
upon which the state could have trampled, because the parents were
still free to exercise control over their children.
The voluntary nature of the New York program should have
indicated to the Alfonso court that there was no deprivation of
parents' liberty interest. The high school, like the family planning
center in Doe, had not imposed any compulsory demand on the
parents. "There is no requirement that the children of the plaintiffs
avail themselves of the services offered... and no prohibition against
the plaintiffs' participating in decisions of their minor children on
issues of sexual activity and birth control."" In Doe, the court did
not allow voluntary access to contraception to be swept into the same
category as compulsory programs, which might have infringed upon
an asserted liberty interest.5 By viewing the condom distribution
program as an intrusion on a fundamental right, the Alfonso court
ignored precedential doctrine and unnecessarily extended the liberty
interest of parents. 2 Sending children into an environment where
48. See id at 1167 (noting that the lower court gave improper latitude to parents' rights
over those of minors and the state).
49. Id. at 1167.
50. I- at 1168.
51. The decision in Doe noted that, "[t]he question in this case is not whether a state may
impose a condition which would limit the right of privacy of the minors whose interests are
involved. Rather, it is whether the Constitution requires such a condition." Doe, 615 F.2d at
1169.
52. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (EiberJ., dissenting) (stating that the constitutionality
of condom distribution programs, absent a parental consent provision, is no longer an issue for
the court to decide. The Supreme Court already addressed the issue of state and federally
funded condom distribution programs and found such services constitutional, even when
parental consent is not required.). The program is constitutional according to Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), which concluded that a New York statute
criminalizing distribution of contraceptives to minors infringes upon minors' constitutional right
to privacy in decisions affecting procreation. State interest and parental rights do not outweigh
minors' rights to use "nonhazardous contraceptives." Id. at 693. The condom distribution
program is also constitutional according to Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980),
which declared that a voluntary birth control program for minors, imposing no compulsory
requirements, does not interfere with parental rights of care, custody and control.
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condoms can be obtained voluntarily does not constitute a deprivation
of an implied fundamental right.
The argument made by the parents that laws require them to send
their children to school has some merit." On the other hand,
condoms, unlike the prescriptive contraceptives at issue in Doe, can
easily be purchased at a local drug store and are a noninvasive
method of birth control. Condoms are in vending machines,
supermarkets, federally funded clinics and other fora."4 Sending
minors into an environment where condoms were merely available, as
opposed to mandatory, would put into question every place a parent
allows a child to go outside of the home. The program did not force
parents to subjugate their influence over their childrens' behavior, or
surrender a constitutional right, by placing the children in the same
building where condoms were available upon request. Parents could
instruct their children not to participate in the program and not to
request condoms.
55
Because the program assessed in Alfonso imposed no compulsory
requirements on students, the parents' liberty interest in guiding their
childrens' decisions about sexual activity and procreation, remained
intact. The voluntary nature of the program is akin to other means
of obtaining condoms (i.e., clinics, commercial sales) where parents'
rights to raise their children according to their own values are not
affected. Voluntary services provided by clinics and schools equally
implicate the rights of parents to nurture and control their childrens'
decisions. Yet, the two courts' inconsistent reasoning in this area
leaves the reader to wonder why the court, in Alfonso, decided to take
a firm stand and strike down the regulatory decision of the Board of
Education on condoms-the least invasive, safest and most available
form of birth control.
53. See Afonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266 (noting that in Doe, parents were not forced to send
their children to the center, as they must send them to school).
54. Lawrence D'Angelo & Kevin Neil, Not Just a Gay Disease, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1994
(Letters to the Editor) at A22 (responding to an article written by George F. Will which
suggested that condom availability outside the school eliminated the need for programs in
public schools). D'Angelo and Neil assert that:
[c]ondoms made available in the context of an education program that includes
counseling, information about the virus and how it is transmitted, instruction on
condom selection and proper usage are essential to the survival of sexually active teens.
These programs ... make available not only condoms but also valuable information
to both sexually active teens and teens who choose to delay sexual activity until later
in life. This information is not available in drugstores.
55. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (EiberJ., dissenting) (arguing that petitioners were not
losing control or influence over their children in their own homes, where the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees them the most protection from state interference in the family).
[Vol. 4:219
Fall 19951 CONDOMS OVERTURNED ON APPEAL
II. MiNoRs' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND CONTRACEPTION
The Alfonso court held that the program was unconstitutional based
on an analysis that mainly focused on the parents' due process rights.
However, the evaluation of the situation was incomplete without
probing into the corresponding rights of the minors, protected under
the same implied liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The students, while not a party to the litigation,5 7 were directly
implicated by the court's decision to place their parents' interest in
controlling their sexuality above their own constitutional rights.5"
The court erred by avoiding the constitutional doctrine that minors
possess a distinct liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Historically, cases involving parental consent issues have focused on
a minors' right to have an abortion 9 These cases have involved a
balancing of the competing rights of the state and the rights of
56. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the fundamental right
to have an abortion applies to minors, and that parental and spousal consent requirements are
unconstitutional). Following Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Poe court chose to "look to
the nature of the right itself in order to determine its availability to minors." Poe, 517 F.2d at
790. Since the Supreme Court has not spoken specifically to the application of the Roe standard
to minors' privacy rights, the Poe court chose to examine the repercussions of denying minors
their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that: "[t]he magnitude of the
minor's interest in avoiding these consequences suggests that the developmental differences
between adults and minors do not warrant denying constitutional protection to the minor's
abortions." Poe, 517 F.2d at 791.
57. See Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (explaining that parents of unemancipated minor
students at local high schools brought suit against the Board of Education of New York City).
58. See Doe, 615 F.2d at 1166 (explaining that minors do possess a constitutional right to
privacy and citing: Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (discussing how the Fourteenth
Amendment protects minors as well as adults); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
692-93 (1977) (noting that an adult's right to privacy in obtaining contraceptives also applies
to minors); and, Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (stating
that parental interest in terminating a minor daughter's pregnancy is not greater than the
daughter's right to privacy). Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (concluding that the
right of privacy includes abortion because of the resultant harm of state restrictions on this
personal liberty).
59. See, eg., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,420 (1983)
(holding that a clty ordinance requiring parental consent, with regard to second trimester
abortions, is unconstitutional because state interests did not outweigh minors' rights to
abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976) (Bellotti 1) (suggesting that a statute
requiring parental consent without alternatives to obtaining abortion is a "most serious barrier"
to pregnant minor's options), 443 U.S. 622, 623 (1979) (Bellotti 11) (holding that a statute
requiring pregnant minors to obtain parental consent or judicial approval upon parental
notification places an unconstitutional burden upon minors seeking abortions). Cf. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Missouri v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983) (noting that a statute
requiring parental consent for minors' abortions is constitutional as long as it includes a
provision allowing judicial consent to substitute for that of her parents). But see H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 417 (1981) (claiming that a minor who desires an abortion without
parental consent, but gives no reason for overriding this statutory requirement, has no standing
to challenge the law's validity).
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minors, with the parents' rights playing a secondary role." Unfortu-
nately, the court in Alfonso did not apply the balancing test under this
rubric of constitutional law. The rights of the parents took on a
primary role, while the rights of the minors were overlooked.
Furthermore, since the parents in Alfonso made it expressly known
that an opt-out provision would satisfy their objections to the program
and terminate further litigation, the court chose to go along with the
parents.6
A. Evaluation of Cases Involving Parental Consent Provisions
Alfonso v. Fernandez is the only case that examines the issue of
whether condom distribution programs may constitutionally be
conditioned upon parental approval. As of 1993, thirty-six school
districts, or eight percent, have condom distribution programs in
effect.62 In eighty percent of the school districts that have a health
education instruction exemption provision, less than one percent of
parents chose to remove their child from such classes.63 Although
direct parental consent is a more stringent requirement than an opt-
out provision, both methods require that parents be notified of the
program and given an opportunity to exempt their child.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether minors' privacy
rights encompassed the right to have an abortion without parental
consent in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.'  The
Court held that a Missouri statute requiring a minor to procure
parental permission before having an abortion did not withstand
constitutional scrutiny." Even though the law may "subject minors
to more stringent limitations than are permissible with respect to
60. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 436 (1990) (stating that when a "statute
unquestionably places obstacles in the pregnant minor's path to an abortion," the burden of
proving its constitutionality is on the state).
61. Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (proposing that a prior consent provision would cure the
claimed constitutional violation of parents' Fourteenth Amendment right). See Eugene C.
Bjorklun, Condom Distribution in the Public Schools, 91 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 11 (1994) (asserting
that the new Chancellor, Ramon C. Cortines, changed the program to conform to the court's
dictates. A letter is now sent to all parents, describing the condom distribution program, along
with an opt-out form. School personnel must adhere to parents' requests and cannot provide
condoms to students who request them if their parents do not consent.).
62. See Bjorklun, supra note 61, at 11 (citing Sarah E. Samuels & Mark D. Smith, eds.,
CONDOMS IN THE SCHOOLS 131-32 (The HenryJ. Kaiser Family Foundation, 1993)). While more
open and frank education about sex and condoms is needed to encourage sexually active
students to use condoms, some school districts have gone even further than just talking. Many
school districts have instituted condom distribution programs in the schools.
63. Bjorklun, supra note 61, at 11.
64. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
65. Id. at 74 (rejecting both spousal and parental consent requirements).
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adults,"66 it remains that a third party does not have a constitutional
right to veto another individual's decision and right of self-determina-
tion, even if the party seeking an abortion is a minor.67 "Constitu-
tional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority."'u
Appellants in Danforth persuasively illustrated that minors in
Missouri were not required to obtain parental consent for other
medical services, such as treatment for venereal diseases, drug abuse
and pregnancy consultation. In fact, "in Missouri a minor legally may
consent to medical services for pregnancy (excluding abortion,
venereal disease, and drug abuse)."69 The restrictions on minors
were unjustified and the state had no significant interest in condition-
ing abortion for minors on permission from a parent where the same
was not required for adults.7" Further, the Danforth Court asserted
that any state interest in strengthening the family and promoting
parental authority did not justify the restriction on minors' privacy
rights.
7 1
The year following Danforth, the Supreme Court, in Carey v.
Population Services International, reviewed the constitutionality of a New
York statute prohibiting distribution of nonprescriptive contraception
to minors under the age of sixteen. 72 After revisiting the issue of the
extent of minors' rights in relation to procreation, the Court
reaffirmed the proposition that "[s] tate restrictions inhibiting privacy
66. I& at 72.
67. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 73-74 (noting that minors are sufficiently mature to make tough
and intelligent choices with the help of a physician and without succumbing to parents' wishes
if the two conflict).
68. Id at 74.
69. Id at 73 (emphasizing minors' autonomy in other areas of health services, including
some which, by definition, are part of reproductive services). See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 431.061-
431.063 (Supp. 1975) (explaining what medical services minors may legally consent to).
70. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-76 (holding that the state of Missouri could not "impose a
blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent.., as a condition for abortion of an
unmarried minor... [because] the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto .... " at all times, regardless of the physician
and minor patients interests). Id. at 74.
71. Id. at 75 (arguing that giving a parent veto power will destroy the family structure, as
opposed to building unity and closeness).
72. 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977) (ruling on the only case to reach the Supreme Court dealing
with contraceptives, and setting rules for their regulation and advertisement). A condom
distributor challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute prohibiting sales to anyone
under sixteen. The statute set forth stringent regulations for buying and selling condoms,
wherein only a licensed pharmacist could distribute contraceptives and all advertising and
displays were banned. The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional because it unfairly
burdened a fundamental right-the decision to bear or beget a child.). See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to an abortion is fundamental and can
only be limited when a state's interest becomes compelling); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (stating that if right to privacy means anything, it is the right to decide whether to
"bear or beget a child").
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rights of minors are valid only if they serve 'any significant state
interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult."'73  Carey
upheld minors' constitutional right to obtain contraception, stating
that:
[s]ince the State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a
blanket requirement of parental consent, on the choice of a minor
to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket
prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a
fortiori foreclosed. 4
Contrasting the implications of receiving abortions and using
contraceptives, Justice Brennan noted that: " [ t]he State's interests in
protection of the ... pregnant minor, and in protection of the
parental life are clearly more implicated by the abortion decision than
by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive. "T
Minors' privacy rights in the matters of both abortion and birth
control have been afforded protection under the privacy doctrine.
76
The Danforth Court found the parental interest in their child's
reproductive decisions "no more weighty than the right of privacy of
the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant."
77
Minors have an independently recognized right to make decisions
relating to procreation without third party intervention.78 Parents
cannot stop their children from asserting their own constitutionally
protected right in the absence of a compelling reason.
79
73. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)).
74. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
75. Id. at 694 (Brennan J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun,JJ.)
76. Doe, 615 F.2d at 1166 (stating that:
[i]n a series of cases dealing with laws affecting the right to abortion, the Supreme
Court has held consistently that a woman's decisions concerning child-bearing are
within the most intimate area of personal privacy. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
... (1973); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600... (1977). One of the first explicit
recognitions of the right of privacy came in a case dealing with a statute which
prohibited the use of contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479... (1965).
Though the state has somewhat broader authority to regulate the conduct of children
that that of adults, minors do possess a constitutionally protected right of privacy.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 ... (1979); Carey v. Populations Sers. Int'l., 431 U.S.
678, 692-93... (1977) .... )
77. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
78. See generally Carey, 431 U.S. at 678 (noting that the right to privacy afforded to adults
when making a decision about having a child is recognized as a right of minors as well. States
may not give a third party absolute control over such decisions in all instances.); Danforth, 428
U.S. at 75 (invalidating a statute that required parental consent for a female under the age of
eighteen, who was seeking an abortion, because it mandated consent by a third person without
a sufficient justification for such a requirement).
79. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court states that
"where a decision as fundamental as that [of] whether to bear or beget a child is involved,
regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must
be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."); Poe, 517 F.2d at 791 (holding that minors
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Subsequent to Carey, in Bellotti v. Baird,"0 the Supreme Court
pronounced that a minor must be able to obtain an abortion in the
absence of parental consent"' Thus, a judicial bypass option was
required where states attempted to limit the rights of minors because
the abortion decision could not wait until the age of majority.8 2
Applying the Carey rationale, unwanted pregnancy was determined to
be an unnecessarily harsh punishment for a female teenager who
engaged in sexual activity and whose parents denied her the choice
to have an abortion because it was contrary to their personal
beliefs. 3
A state cannot impose a parental consent requirement where a
minor chooses to terminate her pregnancy without also offering a
viable alternative. States cannot constitutionally block a minor's
choice to avail herself of the judicial bypass option, for example,
instead of obtaining parental consent.' While the Supreme Court
has not specifically determined whether a state can constitutionally
require parental notice before minors receive birth control, the Court
has held that states have more of a vested interest in minors' decision
possess the fundamental right to an abortion equal to that of adults). The court stated that
fundamental rights can be limited only by a compelling state interest and cited Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 338 U.S. 663 (1966), Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and, Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) in
support of this proposition.
80. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
81. Id (class action suit brought against the Attorney General and District Attorneys of
Massachusetts challenging a statute that dictated the type of consent required in order for an
unmarried woman under the age of eighteen to have an abortion. The appellees claimed that
the statute violated their due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Parental consent was at the heart of the challenge. The Supreme Court held that
because the statute could be interpreted so as to allow the minor to get judicial consent without
notifying her parents, based on the minor being capable of consenting given her own best
interests, then the district court should not have decided the constitutional issue.).
82. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1389 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that "[b] ecause of the
fundamental nature of rights involved, because of the lack of legal sophistication of minors
generally, and because of the urgency inherent in an abortion decision itself, it is imperative that
the procedure [for ajudicial bypass] be spelled out in detail... ."). More recently, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 431 U.S. 678 (1992) the Supreme Court
allowed Pennsylvania to enact a parental consent provision in the abortion laws, but included
ajudicial bypass option for minors under certain circumstances.
83. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 (emphasizing that sexual activity should not be regulated
by creating a public policy which discourages sexual behavior. The state may not assign a value
to private choices by regulating the availability of contraception.); Doe, 615 F.2d at 1167
(discussing the protection of young females from the dangers of unwanted pregnancies).
84. See Wynn, 582 F.2d at 1386-88 (holding that a statute which requires parents to be
informed of their daughter's decision to terminate herpregnancy is overinclusive, underinclusive
and unconstitutionally burdensome on minors). "The minor, accordingly, is in a no-win
situation. If she loses the judicial proceedings, it will be a personal blow, and scarcely a
redemption of the ill feeling and tension that undoubtedly resulted from her parents' refusal
of consent and her taking them to court. If she wins, according to defendants' own expert, she
is likely to find herself in an even worse position." I& at 1389 (quoting Judge Aldrich in Baird
v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Mass. 1978)).
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to have an abortion than to receive contraceptives."5 Logically, one
can conclude that a minor who wants nonprescriptive contraceptives,
such as condoms, should not be required to obtain parental consent
if a minor wanting an abortion has the right to bypass such permis-
sion because of her own protected liberty guarantee. A sexually active
minor denied contraception without parental consent is similar to a
pregnant minor denied an abortion for the same reason. Therefore,
minors have the right to receive contraception without their parents'
knowledge or permission, unless the state, not the court, determines
that parental involvement is essential and relates to some purpose it
seeks to further.
B. The Lower Court's Analysis of the Condom Distribution Program
Absent a Parental Consent Provision
Prior to enacting the condom distribution program, an opt-out
provision was discussed and voted down by the Board. 6 It seems as
though the Board concluded that an opt-out provision would frustrate
one important purpose of the distribution program-anonymity.
Alternatively, the Board proactively encouraged parental participation
in various aspects of the planning, implementation and continuation
of the program. 7
In light of the Board's position, the lower court declined to address
the issue of whether a parental opt-out provision passed constitutional
scrutiny, demonstrating deference to the Board's authority." The
court noted that
[i]t is not the role of the court to set policy on educational
programs; such is the authority given to [the Board] by law ....
[C]ourts should not usurp the administrative functions... [of the
Board]. Education officials are ordinarily vested with wide
discretion in the management of school affairs... [and] resolution
of school conflicts .... 89
85. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 (commenting about the abortion decisions minors' face, and
the state's interest in that decision).
86. Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (holding that an opt-out provision is not an issue to be
decided in this case because the Board did not include it in the program's policy).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 1d. See also Education Law § 2590-(g) (1) (setting forth the role of courts in deferring
to the administrative decisions of school officials); Matter of Board of Educ. of New York v.
Ambach, 517 N.E.2d 509 (1987) (holding that the Commissioner of Education and other
education officials maintain wide discretion in operating the school system); Matter of Board
of Educ. of NewYork v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982) (allowing for deference to school board
officials in the management of the school system, given practical and political issues arising from
that management).
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The Board of Education seemingly devised a program which was
believed to be responsive to the needs of their student body. Before
mandating a change in the structure of the condom distribution
program, such as adding an opt-out provision, "petitioners must show
some right to it as a matter of law."9" Finding no constitutional
entitlement on behalf of the parents, the court felt it must refrain
from legislating an opt-out provision into the program.91 In dicta,
the majority noted that the adoption of a veto provision was not, as
parents contended, a panacea for the distribution program because
exposure to condoms in the school would continue regardless. 2
C. The Appellate Court's Analysis of the Condom Distribution Program
Absent a Parental Consent Provision
The appellate court, reversing the lower court, held that the New
York public schools were prohibited from distributing condoms to
minor students without either a parental consent or opt-out provi-
sion.93 Without specific statutory authority for the condom distribu-
tion program, the appellate court found that it was outside the scope
of their power to constructively legislate.94 Oddly, the lower court
upheld the program for the same reason.95
In order to reach a conclusion so different from that of the lower
court, the appellate court found that the program was a health
service, not an educational program, and was therefore controlled by
section 2504 of the Public Health Law of New York. 6 This provision
presumed the incapacity of minors to make health services decisions
90. Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
91. Id at 411 (holding that judicial activism in this area is outside the role of the court.
Policy decisions regarding education cannot be altered to a more desirable one, as determined
by the court. Parents have no "right to tailor public school programs to individual religious
preferences," citing Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968)).
92. See Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 412 (citing a United States Court of Appeals decision in
support of the court's conclusion thatavoluntary birth control program is not coercive and does
not take away parental control over the care of their children).
93. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
94. See id. at 265 (holding that a state law authorizing this particular program must exist to
have a legitimate exception to the common-law practice of parental consent for medical
procedures). The court viewed the program within the ambit of health services, not educational
services.
95. Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
96. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 1972) (codifying some of the common-law
exceptions to the general incapacity of minors). The parental consent requirement is abolished
for "medical, dental, health and hospital service." lId It is interesting to note that section 2504
delineates the exceptions to the parental consent requirement-it does not control this
particular condom distribution program. The court does not allow for such a program because
condoms are not one of the exceptions.
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absent parental consent.97 No specific exception for a condom
distribution program was listed in the health service code, so the
court held that no authority for such program existed.98 The court
read the statute literally, holding that it was not their job to under-
mine the legislature. 9 Without a specifically delineated exception
for condoms, the program must cease to continue.'00
The court listed the various state laws which have been enacted to
govern minors' access to family planning services without parental
consent, such as the Social Security Act, Medicaid and Title X of the
Public Health Act to emphasize their point:
[w] hile the purpose of the condom availability component of the
program may be commendable, the Legislature has not enacted to
abrogate the common-law rule and to authorize the New York State
Commissioner of Education or the respondents to direct or permit
the delivery of such a health service to minor, unemancipated high
school students in public buildings without some parental role
through opt-out or consent."'
Parental consent was not required for minors in the aforementioned
categories or programs because they had statutory authority. Other
statutorily enacted exceptions to requirements of parental consent
include minors' right to obtain HIV-related tests, and treatment of
sexually transmitted diseases. 12
D. Manipulation of Minors' Rights by the Appellate Court
The appellate court's opinion in Alfonso found the condom
distribution program unconstitutional absent a parental opt-out
provision. 3 The court framed the issue over access to condoms in
the public schools as one which constitutionally demanded an inquiry
into the parental consent option." However, the appellate court
97. Aifonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
98. Id. (agreeing with petitioners' categorization of the program as a health service. The
court did not find an exemption which they felt incorporated the program and thus conditioned
its continuation upon parental consent.).
99. Id at 264.
100. I&
101. Id
102. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
103. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
104. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (holding that "the respondents' plan to dispense condoms
to unemancipated minor children without the consent of their parents or guardians, or an opt-
out provision, violates the civil rights of the parent petitioners and similarly situated parents or
guardians under the substantive due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution . ").
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never addressed the issue of the minors' privacy rights, which had
been central to such an analysis in the past.0"
Parental consent restrictions in the abortion context were only
upheld and supported under one of three theories: the state's
purported interest in protecting the welfare of minors who might not
be able to make intelligent choices about their pregnancy; the state's
desire to protect the family unit; and the need to protect the parents'
right to direct the upbringing of their children.' The Alfonso
court, however, only addressed one of these theories in its analysis:
the parents' right to "regulate their children's sexual behavior as best
they can."' Relying on a line of irreconcilable cases which pio-
neered parents' liberty interest, the court concluded that parental
involvement was constitutionally required.
When a state attempts to restrict the rights of minors through
parental consent, courts balance the state's interests against those of
the minors, and decide whether such restrictions are constitutionally
valid.' 3 The Alfonso court did not address this prong of the tradi-
tional test. Furthermore, the instant case does not fall within the
constitutional paradigm, because the state was aligned in interest with
the students. Clearly, in Alfonso, the Board of Education was seeking
to extend, not limit, minors' rights. This dynamic was ignored by the
court in its treatment of the parental consent issue. A commentator
who exposed the court's misuse of shifting interests as between
parents, minors, and the state in the context of minors and abortions,
stated that:
[b]y refraining from notification and consent requirements, a state
does not prevent the parents' participation. Instead, it is the
daughter who decides whether or not to preclude parental involve-
ment. The Court's reliance on parental rights precedents in this
context is inapposite because those cases dealt with parents' rights
105. See Doe, 615 F.2d at 1166 (stating that
[o]ne of the first explicit recognitions of the right of privacy came in a case dealing
with a statute which prohibited the use of contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Though the state has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the conduct of children than that of adults, minors do
possess a constitutionally protected right of privacy.).
See also Belott4 443 U.S. at 633-34 (stating that although the constitutional rights of adults and
children cannot be evaded, minors do have the protection of the Constitution); Carey, 431 U.S.
at 692-93 (describing the various rights that minors have under the Constitution, which are
afforded the same protection as adults); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75 (stating that minors, as well
as adults, are afforded protection by the Constitution of the United States); Wjnn, 582 F.2d at
1383-84 (discussing minors' rights and their evolution of such rights).
106. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444 (discussing the factors which comprise the state's strong
interest in protecting the welfare of pregnant minors and the family unit).
107. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
108. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417.
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as balanced against the state interests, not parents' rights as against
those of their children."°
By shifting the framework of the controversy to the issue of parental
consent, the court retained the ability to restrict minors' rights to
access condoms.
If analyzed according to the true conflict, the state would be
removed from the triangle. Only the competing rights of the students
and the parents would be in the balancing equation. As between the
students and their parents, the minors' right to privacy is extremely
strong.n0 The argument that the Constitution required notice to
parents before their child had access to condoms was an insupport-
able position. The Alfonso court was aware of this dichotomy, and
manipulated the minors' rights out of its analysis through carefully
constructed rhetoric.
III. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST FOR PROTECTION OF MINORS'
PuBLIc HEALTH OVERLOOKED BY THE APPELLATE COURT IN ALFONSO
The Alfonso court found that the parents demonstrated an intrusion
on their constitutionally protected rights even though the program
was voluntary."' The court did not find a compelling state interest
which would overcome what it viewed as the parents' due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.' The decision held
that
[t]he issue is not one of purpose but one of effect. We must take
great care not to be blinded by the concept that the end justifies
the means .... [W]e conclude that the policy intrudes on the
petitioners' rights by interfering with parental decision making in
a particularly sensitive area."'
However, the court did not examine the reality of teens' contraceptive
options and sexual activity when they concluded that no compelling
109. Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privaty Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights of
Minor; 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 629 (1993).
110. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (Eiber, J., dissenting) (noting that a parental consent
requirement runs contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) which extended the privacy right to obtain nonprescriptive contraceptives
to minors).
111. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265 (claiming that parents are forced to send their children into
an environment where obtaining condoms is encouraged by the school, in violation of parental
authority and lacking a compellingreason for the state to uphold the program without including
a parental consent provision).
112. I& at 265 (concluding that because sexually active students would be able to get
condoms in other ways besides the condom distribution program, the program was not necessary
to fulfill the compelling state interest of preventing AIDS, and therefore, did not justify
interfering with the parents' due process rights).
113. I& at 266.
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state interest for the condom distribution program existed.' A
review of the policy considerations involved signifies the need for the
program to remain in the school, and the weakness of the court's
reasoning.
The United States has a higher teen pregnancy rate than any other
developed country," In 1987, the National Research Council
recommended encouraging diligent contraceptive use as a teen
pregnancy prevention strategy. According to Joycelyn Elders,"6 the
United States "refuse [s] to make a commitment to solving the crises
of teenage motherhood because we view pregnancy as just punish-
ment for the sin of premarital sex."' 7  Communities should teach
responsibility for sexual activity. The puritanical ethos being
defended by the New York appellate court bears no relation to reality
and does not necessarily promote the public welfare of those who
adhere to its message. The cost to society of the soaring rate of teen
pregnancy demands attention and solutions, yet the appellate court
was unwilling to endorse the preventative strategy outlined by our
nation's educators.
The Alfonso court wrongly concluded that it was condoms, and not
the students themselves, who were the means for engaging in sexual
activity."' The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that a
minor who has access to birth control is more likely to engage in
sexual activity in several cases." 9 The Court, in Carey v. Population
114. Id. at 266 (focusing instead on the parents lack of choice, the court stated that through
implementation of the condom distribution program, parents would be forced to send their
children into an environment where there would be "unrestricted access" to contraceptives.
Despite the health threat posed by AIDS and the wish of school officials to slow the spread of
the disease as well as the possibility of pregnancy and other sexually transmitted diseases, the
program, nonetheless, essentially removes from parents their rights of supervision and control
over their children.).
115. See Paul & Klassel, supra note 22, at 45 (citing Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Henshaw,
Lincoln, Rostoff, Westoff & Wulf, Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: Determinants of Policy
Implications, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 53 (1985)).
116. As U.S. Surgeon General,Joycelyn Elders stood at the forefront of advocating programs
designed to teach safer sex and lower teen pregnancy. In December, 1994,just one month after
extensive Republican electoral victories, President Clinton requested Dr. Elders' resignation.
SeeJessica Portner, Elders'Departure May Signal Shift on Health Issues, Advocates Predict, EDUC. WEEK,
Jan. 11, 1995, at 21 (reporting that Elders' departure is only the beginning of a broad
conservative shift in Washington). According to Portner, both Elders' dismissal and the "newly
configured Congress signal a dramatic shift to the right on school-health issues at the Federal
level." Id.
117. M. Joycelyn Elders, Jennifer Hui & Steff Padilla, Adolescent Pregnancy: Does the Nation
Really Care?., 15 BERKELEY WOMEN's LJ. 170, 172 (1989-90).
118. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266 (distributing condoms sends a message of sexual
experimentation, which the court is uncomfortable endorsing).
119. See, eg., Carey, 431 U.S. at 679 (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to support the Court's
reasoning that limiting access to birth control will not necessarily discourage teenage sexual
activity).
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Services International, based its decision, in part, on the lack of
evidence demonstrating that access to birth control promotes teen
sexuality.12' Even Justice Stevens, who did not join the Carey plurali-
ty, likened such logic to an attempt to "dramatize" state "disapproval
of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets."1 21 Studies
of adolescents conducted by family planning clinics repeatedly
indicate that parental involvement in birth control decisions does not
deter teens from engaging in sexual activity.
122
Other studies illustrate that nine out of ten teenagers come to
family planning clinics after having engaged in sexual intercourse,
and most have been active for a year or more by the time of their first
visit"12 Clearly, impediments to contraception access do not affect
the rate of teenage sexuality. These statistics demonstrate that many
teenagers do not consult their parents about such emotional
topics. 2 4  Parents may have a constitutional right to give their
children good advice and guidance, but parents do not have a
protected right to keep their children from engaging in sexual activity
or from making decisions about birth control. Access to condoms has
no direct relationship to whether or not a teenager decides to have
sexual intercourse." Disproving this part of petitioners' argument
leaves only one remaining basis for their due process claim: the
condom distribution program created an option for teenagers that
some parents found inappropriate.
The Alfonso court noted that children were not just being exposed
to contrary ideas or disagreeable opinions.126  In dicta, the court
120. Carey, 431 U.S. at 679.
121. Id. at 715.
122. See Aida Torres, Jacqueline Forrest, andJulianne Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies
and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 291 (1980)
(noting that 54% of teens surveyed told their parents that they were using contraceptives and
18% did not tell their parents, but stated they would return to the clinic even if they needed
parental consent).
123. See LS. Zabin & S.O. Clark, Why They Delay: A Study of Teenage Family Planning Clinic
Patients, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 205, 213 (1981) (finding that more than 85% of patients are
sexually active prior to their first clinic visit); AIDS and Adolescents: The Time for Prevention Is Now
(Center for Population Options, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1987 [hereinafter AlDS andAdolescents]
(reporting that 50% of males and 33% of females in U.S. high schools have had intercourse.
Yet, less than 10% of high school students participate in comprehensive sexual education
courses.). Id. at 5.; Teens'Survey of Stores in the District of Columbia on Accessibility of Family Planning
Methods (Center for Population Options, Washington, D.C.), 1988 [hereinafter Teens'Survey of
Stores] (observing that one in seven teen women attends a family planning clinic prior to her
first intercourse. Most female teens delay visiting a clinic for an average of 11.5 month after
initially having intercourse.). Id. at 3.
124. See source cited supra note 122 (giving general discussion of parent-child relationships
and the lack of communication concerning sexual activity).
125. See supra notes 122, 123 and accompanying text.
126. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266 (addressing the minority's view that the program is not
constitutionally invalid because it is wholly voluntary).
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suggested that if this were the situation, a due process claim would fail
right alongside the free exercise of religion assertion.127 The court
thought, however, that the distribution of condoms engendered more
than just an environment which some parents found offensive.1
28
The physical availability of condoms went beyond the constitutional
limit.' 29  Unlike literature or conversation, the school provided
students with the means to "engage in sexual activity at a lower risk
of pregnancy and contracting sexually transmitted diseases. " 1'0
Aside from the irony of this quotation, the appellate court ignored
two crucial factors: the school did not require any student to receive
a condom and dispensing condoms does not encourage sexual
activity. 13
Another crisis facing teens is the increasing risk of contracting AIDS
and other diseases. 32 According to the appellate court, "the threat
of AIDS cannot summarily obliterate [America's] fundamental val-
ues."' 3 The court does not view AIDS prevention as a responsibility
to be shared by everyone, including schools, youth agencies, parents
and even religious organizations. The court's refusal to recognize the
impact AIDS can, and already does, have on sexually active teens
127. See id. (noting that if the problem was merely parents complaining about objectionable
information, the claim would fail because the public school needs to prepare students for the
real world).
128. 1& (distributing condoms goes beyond verbal discussion since the second component
of the program crosses the threshold test for objectionable ideas and moves outside the realm
of protected speech).
129. See Paul & Klassel, supra note 22, at 49 (noting that the actual distribution of
contraceptives is a distinction made by conservatives attempting to assert parental rights over
minors' rights to privacy). Paul and Klassel suggest that the liberal trend of the 1970s, which
fostered an expansion of rights to minors (i.e., allowed them to consent to contraceptive care),
began to crumble in the 1980s due to the rise of the religious right. Id The religious right is
putting pressure on government agencies to restrict availability of contraceptives to minors,
regardless of personal privacy issues. Id. at 50.
130. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
131. See id. at 261 (observing that condoms were available only upon request and a
mandatory component of the classroom instruction stressed abstinence from sexual activity); see
also Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 (stating that minors, like adults, have a constitutional right to use
nonhazardous contraceptives).
132. See Maureen E. Lyon, Not Just a Gay Disease, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1994 (Letters to the
Editor) at A22. Lyon, a doctor from the Burgess Clinic at Children's National Medical Center
in the Department of Adolescent and Young Adult Medicine submitted this letter. Dr. Lyon
reports that most of the patients diagnosed as HIV-positive are young heterosexual women. The
World Health Organization found that worldwide infection rates indicate that adolescents are
the fastest growing group contracting the disease. According to the Centers for Disease Control,
transmission among youth is mainly through heterosexual sex (26%), as opposed to homosexual
encounters or intravenous drug use. In the District of Columbia, one out of every 65 teen
mothers tests HIV-positive. The rate of H1V infection for adolescents has increased by 400% in
the past five years, according to testing done at Children's Hospital in the District of Columbia.
133. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
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blatantly overlooks all evidence that teens need access to con-
doms."M The average age of intercourse nationwide is sixteen, and
as low as twelve in some communities, yet teenagers are neglecting to
protect themselves by using condoms regularly."3 5  Therefore,
increasing condom availability would arguably reduce HIV infection
among teens by enabling condom use among sexually active minors.
A powerful dissen1 3 attacks the majority opinion's refusal to accept
the AIDS epidemic as a compelling state interest, especially since the
consequence is death.'37
The spread of AIDS has reached alarming proportions giving rise
to a compelling state interest to halt the growth of the epidemic.
Clearly, many parents, . . . are seeking to protect their health and
morality. The majority overlooks the unfortunate reality that many
children lack such interested parents .... Since the consequence
of contracting AIDS is death, providing practical protection against
the spread of the virus which causes it, to a high risk population
... outweighs the minimal intrusion into the parent/child
relationship .... "
The majority court's moralistic view contravenes all empirical data
about the AIDS crises. The majority in Alfonso asks people to accept
134. Justice Eiber's dissenting opinion in Alfyonso proclaims that "the reality is that adolescents
are engaging in sexual intercourse in large numbers." Id. at 268. New York City adolescents
equal only three percent of the nation's teenagers, but this group of youth comprise twenty
percent of all reported cases of teen AIDS. Id. Twenty-nine percent of AIDS cases in the United
States are in the age group of twenty to twenty-nine. This statistic means that with the disease's
latency period, a high number of individuals are contracting the disease while they are in their
teens. Id.
135. See AIDS and Adolescents, supra note 123 (describing the high proportion of teens who
are at risk of contractingAIDS through sexual experimentation without the proper information
about their health and safety). Haffner's paper encourages condom usage and education. Id.
at 3-4. Putting the Boys in the Picture: A Rndew of Programs to Promote Sexual Responsibility Among
YoungMales (Carnegie Corp. of NewYork, NewYork, N.Y.), 1988, at 107 [hereinafter Putting the
Boys in the Picture] (noting that the average age of a boy's first intercourse is 12 in "some
communities," yet more than 50% of these males use no contraception during their first
encounter and only roughly 25% of all sexually active male teens currently use condoms).
136. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (Eiber, J., dissenting) (arguing that the reality is that
youths are sexually active and that in an effort to prevent the spread of the HIV virus, condoms
should be made available).
137. See H.R. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOuTH, AND FAMIuES, AIDS AND TEENAGERS:
EMERGiNG IssuEs 1 (1988) (discussing the fact that teenagers are the fastest growing group of
individuals testing positive for the HIV virus). The Center for Disease Control reports that
226,281 cases of teen AIDS have been recorded as of 1992. The number of teenagers with AIDS
doubled between 1989 and 1991. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SELECTED BEHAVIORS THAT
INCREASE RISK FOR HIV INFECTION AMONG HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS-UNITED STATES 1990,
MORBIDITY & MORTAITIY WEEKLY REP. 41 (Apr. 10, 1992).
138. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (EiberJ., dissenting).
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that the intrusion on parental lights is so severe that it outweighs all
concems for the adolescent populations health and safety.'39
To justify their position that the threat of AIDS does not override
the parents' right to raise their children as they see fit, and that it is
not necessary for schools to provide condoms, the appellate court
stated that minors are able to acquire condoms with little difficulty at
local drug and convenience stores.140 The appellate court states
that a teenager who so desires can purchase a condom legally "for
about the same price as a slice of pizza."' 4 ' This reasoning both
evades and denies the severity of the situation.
In determining the level of condom availability in locations other
than schools, the appellate court did not consider the real life
mechanics of teenage sexual encounters and decision-making about
birth control. Studies indicate that while teens are generally
knowledgeable about where to get condoms, many encounter barriers
when actually purchasing them. In Washington, D.C., forty-five drug
stores and fifteen convenience stores were surveyed about the physical
location, pricing, and clerks' attitudes toward the sale of condoms to
teens.'4
The results indicate that condoms are difficult to locate, behind the
counter thirty-five percent of the time, separate from other forms of
birth control in half the stores, lack signs indicating where condoms
are located on the shelf (thirteen percent had signs), and vary in
price from $1.42 to $2.99 for a pack of three. 143 The survey also
indicates that females report being harassed forty percent of the time
when they are the purchasers." This survey makes clear that the
accessibility of family planning methods involves a multitude of
considerations which were either oversimplified or disregarded by the
court.
145
139. Id at 266-67 (quoting Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420 (1989),
the Alfonso court stated that "[als with other grave risks we have faced during the past two
centuries, the threat of AIDS cannot summarily obliterate this Nation's fundamental values.'
Accordingly, we must ask whether an interference in the petitioners' rights is necessary to meet
this public health threat .... The answer must clearly be no.").
140. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266 (asserting that providing condoms in schools is
unnecessary and does not qualify as a compelling state interest because teens can purchase
condoms legally in other convenient locations).
141. IM. (Brief for Petitioner).
142. See Teens'Survey of Stores, supra note 123, at 8 (surveying stores that sold condoms in an
effort to determine the availability, cost and obstacles to obtaining them, and hypothesizing that
access is impeded. The results highlighted the need for society to address the issues of
confidentiality and convenience regarding family planning services.).
143. Id. at 4-5. Note that the survey was taken in 1988 and prices have since increased.
144. Id. at 4-5.
145. See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (stating in their brief in support of respondents, amici
pointed out that publicly finded non-school services provide contraception to minors and fulfill
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The role that young males play in teen sexuality is another concern
which is not given enough attention by policy makers. 46 Males are
directly involved in the choice of whether or not to use contraception,
while females are the ones who deal with the actual pregnancy and
related decisions. Who initiates the use of contraception and who
actually purchases or otherwise acquires contraception are important
considerations. Family planning clinics report that males do not seek
services in what they believe are female-oriented clinics. 147  The
need for male involvement and education is great.1 48  Males must
be taught as much about pregnancy, sexuality, disease and contracep-
tion as females. Studies of teenage males indicate that they have
low levels of knowledge about pregnancy risk. 50 Only twenty-seven
percent of male respondents age nineteen to twenty-seven know when
risk of pregnancy during the menstrual cycle is the greatest.1 51 Even
though boys know far less than girls, they wield a large degree of
influence over their partners' choice to use contraception, and the
type of contraception used.'52
Peer pressure and lack of confidence among teenagers leads to
skewed patterns of use and awareness about contraception. 5 3 When
formal sex education classes have been offered, the course typically
does not address-"where and how do I obtain contraception?""
The need for sexually active teens to receive factually correct family
the state's goal of providing access to birth control for minors).
146. See generally Elders, Hui & Padilla, supra note 117, at 178 (stating that "[wi]e have
ignored male responsibility and relegated many of our disadvantaged young men to the position
of expressing their manhood through fathering children."); Putting the Boys in the Picture, supra
note 135, at 107 (focusing on the role young men play in sexual activity and the programs that
target males); A Condom Distribution Program for Adolescents: The Findings of a Feasibility Study
(American Public Health Association, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1970 at 19 [hereinafter A
Condom Distribution Program] (studying the frequency of condom usage when accessibility is
improved).
147. See Putting the Boys in the Picture, supra note 135, at vii.
148. A Condom Distribution Program, supra note 146 (concluding that young males are willing
to take responsibility for family planning. Since condoms are found to be an acceptable
contraceptive by adolescent males, they should be offered as part of family planning programs.).
149. AIDS and Adolescents, supra note 123, at 2-3 (highlighting that studies indicate that most
teenagers know very little about AIDS, how it is and is not spread, and how to protect
themselves).
150. Putting the Boys in the Picture, supra note 135 (noting that males who have taken sex
education classes know more than males who have not, nonetheless, the amount of knowledge
is greatly lacking).
151. AIDS and Adoescents, supra note 123, at 30.
152. AIDS and Adolescents, supra note 123, at 30 (explaining that boys express that their
pleasure is lessened when condoms or IUD's are used, and that buying and using contraception
is embarrassing to them).
153. AIDS and Adolescents, supra note 123, at 12-13.
154. AIDS and Adolescents, supra note 123, at 30.
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planning information and conveniently accessible condoms, is
overwhelmingly obvious, except to the appellate court.
IV. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAIM DISMISSED BY THE LOWER
AND APPELLATE COURTS BECAUSE THE PROGRAM WAS
VOLUNTARY
Both the lower court and the appellate court agreed that no
violation of the parents' right to the free exercise of their religion
could be found because of the voluntary nature of the program.'55
The Supreme Court had previously examined exposure to objection-
able ideas and decided that there had to be a compulsory or
prohibitory element to interfere with individual rights.' 56 The
appellate court could not justify upholding a free exercise of religion
violation in the face of such clear constitutional doctrine.
Rejecting petitioners claim under the First Amendment, the court
held that the parents were not being denied the ability to practice
their religion, or coerced in the nature of these practices.'-" The
parents found the program offensive and objectionable, but such a
reaction did not rise to the level of a constitutional burden. 5 '
Distinguishing the cases which the parents used to support their
argument, the court noted that "the crucial word in the constitutional
test is 'prohibit.""5 9  Consistently, the court has viewed indirect
social pressure as a part of life rather than a violation of family
155. Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 409-11 (explaining that because the parents had not been
denied their right to practice their religion, nor stopped from raising their children as they saw
fit, since the program was voluntary, a free exercise of religion claim could not be found);
Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (agreeing with the lower court, the appellate court further noted
that parents do not have a constitutional right to change public school programs to fit their
religious beliefs. Since the students would not face any punishment if they chose not to
participate in the condom distribution program, the parents could not successfully claim that
their right to practice their religion or their children's right to do the same was violated under
the Free Exercise Clause.).
156. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 1503-04 and accompanying text (stating that the "[tihe
concept of 'offensiveness' as a burden on the free exercise of religion has been summarily
rejected where the challenged practice involves nothing more than providing the potential for
sinful behavior.").
157. SeeAlfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (quoting St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of NewYork,
914 F.2d 348 (2nd Cir. 1990)) ("The central question in identifying an unconstitutional burden
is whether the claimant has been denied the ability to practice his religion or coerced in the
nature of those practices." Id at 355).
158. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1987)
(addressing the constitutionality of a mandatory reading program), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988).
159. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)
(commenting that the government did not have to show a compeliingjustification for voluntary
programs).
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rights."6 Voluntary programs do not compel individuals to abandon
their convictions or present obstacles to practicing one's beliefs." 1
Thus, the program was immune from a free exercise of religion
attack.
The court's analysis of the free exercise of religion claim provides
an interesting comparison with its position on the parents' due
process claim. Illogically, the voluntary program usurped the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children, but did not violate
their ability to freely exercise their religion. 2 Condom availability
in the school did not prohibit parents from providing moral and
religious guidance and religion to their children. 16 The court
explicitly recognized that an atmosphere of mere availability:
[d]oes not prohibit the petitioning parents and/or their children
from practicing their religion. Nor does it directly or indirectly
coerce them to engage in conduct or practices which are contrary
to their religious beliefs."6
Parents' constitutional right to be notified when contraceptives were
distributed to unemancipated minors, on the other hand, is an issue
that has neither been resolved nor is historically rooted. In an
attempt to direct the future of this unsettled issue, the court's erratic
opinion found the voluntary program implemented by the state
sufficiently objectionable to constitute a violation of parental rights.
The lower court maintained that whether the claim was phrased as
either a free exercise or due process claim, the program must
overcome a constitutional challenge because of its voluntary na-
ture."6 The rationale of the appellate court, when deconstructed,
160. See Mozet 827 F.2d at 1058 (stating that
the requirement that public school students study a basal reader series chosen by the
school authority does not create an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise
Clause when the students are not required to affim or deny a belief or engage or
refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or required by their religion.
See also Smith v. Board of Educ., 844 F.2d 90, 94 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that because
attending graduation ceremonies was not required in order to graduate, holding the ceremony
on a Saturday did not violate an orthodoxJewish student's right to free exercise of religion).
161. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (holding that without any
element of overt coercion, no free exercise of religion violation could be ascertained).
162. See Donna M. Werner, Note, Ware v. Valley Stream High School District: At What Expense
Should Religiousredom BePreered., 64 ST.JoHN's L. REV. 347 (1990) (noting that the program
at issue was not designed to teach moral conduct, but rather, to teach health practices meant
to prevent students from contracting and/or spreading disease).
163. See Afonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (noting the opportunity which parents have to involve
themselves in the program, such as being part of an HIV/AIDS Advisory Council or an
alternative Parent Education Committee).
164. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
165. See Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 406 (claiming that the voluntary nature of the program
meant that the parents' claim amounted to nothing more than a moral lawsuit, rather than a
prima facie case under the body of due process law developed by the highest courts of the land).
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appears to be a carefully manipulated interpretation of firmly
established legal principles.
CONCLUSION
The Alfonso v. Fernandez decision symbolizes a change in social and
legal policy toward teenage sexuality that contradicts judicial doctrine
and the very concept of progress. The "ostrich" approach" adopt-
ed by the New York Appellate Court, overruling the lower court's
decision, will not further the state's rationale for implementing the
condom distribution program-confidential access. Mandatory
parental involvement has repeatedly been proven to prevent minors
from behaving in the most responsible manner possible, while also
failing to lower the incidence of actual intercourse. Parental
involvement will not lower currently rising percentages of teenage
mothers, teen AIDS victims, nor strengthen the family unit. Society
should encourage adolescents to make mindful choices. Instead, the
court's holding in Alfonso transgresses the minors' privacy rights and
the state's ability to enact forward-thinking legislation. It is counter-
productive and hypocritical to bemoan social ills while refusing to
discuss them in the appropriate and necessary forum. Schools and
local communities, who are best equipped to formulate policies and
experiment with educational programs, have been jettisoned by this
example of judicial activism.167 The appellate court created a
fictitious constitutional right when it determined that the liberty
interest of parents in their childrens' sexual activities exceeds the
rights of the State, the students, and society as a whole.
166. This author's colloquial use of the term in this context means "sticking their heads in
the sand to avoid the real issues."
167. The SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts, in Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth,
652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995), granted summaryjudgment in favor of the school committee when
parents alleged that a program of condom availability, established in junior and senior high
school, violated their rights to familial privacy, parental liberty and free exercise of religion. The
court held that the program, which made condoms available to students without parental
consent or parental opt-out provisions, did not violate either the fundamental liberty interest
of parents to be free from unnecessary governmental intrusion in rearing their children, or the
free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, relying on Alfonso v. Fernandez,
argued that the condom availability program was coercive. Although participation was voluntary,
the program had been implemented in the compulsory setting of the public schools. The
Massachusetts court disagreed with the reasoning of the Alfonso court and articulated that the
holding in Alfonso was erroneously decided. Citing the dissent from Alfonso, the Curtis court held
that no coercive burden on the parental liberties existed because no classroom participation was
required of students. Students were not required to seek out and accept the condoms, read the
literature accompanying them, or participate in counseling regarding their use. The program
did not qualify as state action of a coercive or compulsory nature, and did not constitute a viable
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The condom program in the public schools will
remain uncompromised in Massachusetts, leaving this issue ripe forjudicial review by the United
States Supreme Court to resolve the differences amongst the states.
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